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INTRODUCTION 
In our capitalist economy, the domain of competition is very large. 
We ordinarily think of competition as the default rule. In our aspirations, 
it controls every market and every transaction. Unless constrained, sellers 
decide what to make and how much to charge for it, and buyers decide 
whether and how much to purchase. Sellers are also free to insist on any 
particular contractual terms that they wish governing price, quantity, dis-
counts, bundling with other products, and the like. 
To be sure, this particular default rule is riddled with limitations, both 
public and private. The government restricts what people can make by 
enacting safety rules, aesthetic rules, performance standards, explicit 
  
 ∗ Ben V. & Dorothy Willie Professor of Law, University of Iowa College of Law. A version of 
this paper was delivered as the Daniel Meador Lecture on Empire at the University of Alabama School 
of Law (Feb. 4, 2008). 
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competition rules, or, in some cases, outright prohibitions. The state may 
also either set the price or impose severe constraints on firms’ ability to 
set their own prices. Private agreements also serve to limit the range of 
things people can make, the amount they can produce, or the price they 
must charge. 
“Competition policy” refers to the full range of public rules and sanc-
tions designed to ensure that markets are as competitive as they can realis-
tically be, consistent with these other policies. In the United States, the 
term competition policy certainly includes the antitrust laws as a central 
component, but competition policy is in fact much broader. For example, 
many regulatory agencies, including the Federal Communications Com-
mission and the Securities and Exchange Commission, operate under man-
dates that require them to take concerns for competition into account in 
making regulatory decisions.1 Well-established rules within intellectual 
property policy, such as the doctrines of patent and copyright misuse or 
the first sale doctrine, serve to protect competition by applying the policies 
of those statutes as a kind of substitute for the antitrust laws.2 And some of 
our concerns about competition are addressed through the common law 
tort system, in particular the law of business torts.3  
Our policy toward innovation is an essential part of competition policy 
because the social rewards from maintaining competitiveness in innovation 
are so large. Indeed, the portion of economic growth that comes from in-
novation greatly exceeds the portion that comes from increased price com-
petition.4 
The term “innovation” refers to something that is much different from 
the intellectual property laws. By innovation, we mean the act of develop-
ing and promulgating some new idea, expression, process, or thing, in 
many cases for profit. By contrast, the IP laws are legal rules that make up 
a small part of the constraints and incentives society imposes to facilitate 
innovation. Significantly, just as competition policy is much broader than 
antitrust, so too innovation policy is much broader than the patent, copy-
right, trademark, and related laws that we collectively refer to as the IP 
  
 1. See, e.g., Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 127 S. Ct. 2383, 2396 (2007) (noting that 
the SEC must take concerns for competition into account when regulating issuance of initial public 
offerings); Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 412–13 
(2004) (finding that the FCC was acting as an “effective steward of the antitrust function”). 
 2. See Thomas F. Cotter, Misuse, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 901, 901–02 (2007); Thomas F. Cotter, 
The Procompetitive Interest in Intellectual Property Law, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 483, 483 (2006). 
 3. See, e.g., DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 1299–1317 (2000); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, 
TORTS 575–610 (1999). 
 4. See Robert M. Solow, Technical Change and the Aggregate Production Function, 39 REV. 
ECON. & STAT. 312, 316–17 (1957); see also F. M. SCHERER & DAVID ROSS, INDUSTRIAL MARKET 
STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 613–17 (3d ed. 1990); Herbert Hovenkamp, Restraints on 
Innovation, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 247, 253 (2007). 
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laws. Innovation is also furthered by tort rules, traditional property rules, 
direct regulation, and public funding. 
By common consensus, the two most important prerequisites for 
healthy innovation are a large public domain of ideas and protection for 
the incremental innovations that continuously enrich our stock. The first of 
these is essential. Every innovation builds on the works of others, some of 
whom are acknowledged and others who are not.5 As Judge Alex Kozinski 
wrote in a well-known dissent: 
[O]verprotecting intellectual property is as harmful as underpro-
tecting it. Creativity is impossible without a rich public domain. 
Nothing today, likely nothing since we tamed fire, is genuinely 
new: Culture, like science and technology, grows by accretion, 
each new creator building on the works of those who came before. 
Overprotection stifles the very creative forces it’s supposed to nur-
ture.6 
The second prerequisite for healthy innovation—protection for new 
ideas—may be less essential, but it is important too. Further, its impor-
tance may vary considerably from one situation to the next, and the fact 
that this protection is “for limited Times,” as the IP Clause of the Consti-
tution mandates, is essential.7 After a time, innovations must go into the 
public domain so that they can incentivize further innovations without con-
straint.8 
The problem that this raises, of course, is that the size of the public 
domain and the scope of IP protection are inversely related. Every grant of 
an IP right reduces the size of the public domain, and the broader the IP 
right the greater the reduction. An optimal IP policy tries to find the spot 
that maximizes the net gains from the incremental social value of increased 
exclusivity less the loss of social value from the reduced public domain as 
  
 5. See, e.g., JARED DIAMOND, GUNS, GERMS, AND STEEL: THE FATES OF HUMAN SOCIETIES 
244–45 (1998) (stating that the key to an innovative society is the ability to build on the work of oth-
ers). For a much more extreme view, see MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID K. LEVINE, AGAINST 
INTELLECTUAL MONOPOLY (2008); Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine, Perfectly Competitive Inno-
vation, FED. RES. BANK OF MINN. RES. DEP’T STAFF REP. 303, March 2002, at 5, available at 
http://woodrow.mpls.frb.fed.us/research/sr/sr303.pdf. 
 6. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1513 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J., 
dissenting). 
 7. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress the power to “promote the progress of 
science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to 
their respective writings and discoveries”). 
 8. Landes and Posner speak of the “incentive” and “access” trade-off, arguing that the trade-off 
is important but cannot account for everything. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, 
THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 11 (2003). For some of the issues 
regarding the trade-off, see id. at 326–27. See generally Pamela Samuelson, Enriching Discourse on 
Public Domains, 55 DUKE L.J. 783 (2006). 
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well as the administrative and litigation costs of running the IP system. By 
contrast, the giving of IP rights which do nothing to enlarge the ex ante 
incentive to innovate reduces the size of the public domain without giving 
anything in return.9 
Antitrust policy and the IP laws are both concerned with practices that 
restrain competition unnecessarily by reducing the size of the public do-
main beyond that which the Constitution contemplates or as Congress in-
tended for them to be expanded. In fact, antitrust has a dual role as pro-
moter of competition in IP-intensive markets. It regulates both restraints 
on competition and restraints on innovation. A good example of the for-
mer is the regulation of price fixing in patent licensing. Ever since the 
Supreme Court created a controversial exception to the antitrust rule 
against price fixing in patent licenses in its 1926 GE decision, the legal 
status of such price fixes has been controversial.10 Price fixing in patent 
licenses actually increases the returns to innovation because the earnings in 
a cartelized licensing market are presumably greater than those in a com-
petitive licensing market; otherwise, firms would have no incentive to fix 
prices. To be sure, the problem is a little more subtle than this. The incen-
tive to innovate depends on ex ante anticipation of returns. Before the 
availability of price fixing would increase the incentive to innovate, the 
innovator must be able to anticipate that price fixing in the resulting inno-
vation was possible. Significantly, however, to the extent the antitrust laws 
express a policy against price fixing in licensing markets, the policy is that 
this particular increased incentive to innovate is improper. 
But antitrust also regulates restraints on innovation, such as when it 
condemns attempts to shrink the public domain improperly in ways that 
also injure competition. The classic example is the Walker Process case in 
1965, which held that a patent infringement action based on a fraudulently 
obtained patent could be an antitrust violation, provided that market com-
petition was injured as well.11 The logic of Walker Process is simple 
  
 9. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966) (“Congress may not authorize the 
issuance of patents whose effects are to remove existent knowledge from the public domain, or to 
restrict free access to materials already available.”); see also Christina Bohannan, Copyright Harm, 
Foreseeability and Fair Use, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 969 (2007) (arguing that fair use should be inter-
preted broadly when an alleged infringement does not cause provable harm to copyright holder); 
Charlotte Hess & Elinor Ostrom, Ideas, Artifacts, and Facilities: Information as a Common-Pool 
Resource, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 111, 114–15 (2003); Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 
EMORY L.J. 965, 968–69 (1990); Mark Rose, Nine-Tenths of the Law: The English Copyright Debates 
and the Rhetoric of the Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 75, 87 (2003); Samuelson, supra 
note 8. 
 10. United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926); see 12 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, 
ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 2041a (2d ed. 2005); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, MARK D. JANIS & MARK A. 
LEMLEY, IP AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LAW § 31.1 (2002 & Supp. 2008); LANDES & POSNER, supra note 8, at 382–85. 
 11. Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 174 (1965); see 
also 3 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 706 (3d ed. 2008). 
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enough: once Congress and the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) have 
established the prerequisites for a patent, someone who intentionally dece-
ives the PTO into thinking these prerequisites have been met is trying to 
patent something that rightfully belongs to the public. At that point, this 
improper attempt becomes a Patent Act violation, with the probable result 
that the patent is not enforceable.12 If the patentee then attempts to enforce 
this patent and the structural requirements for monopoly are present, then 
this enforcement action is also an antitrust violation. 
The first-line protectors of the competitive process in innovation are 
the IP statutes themselves. The constitutional mandate to Congress to 
create intellectual property regimes in order to “promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts” is expressly tied to creating incentives to inno-
vate.13 Indeed, the IP Clause is the only place where the Constitution ex-
pressly links the scope of a property right to the incentive to develop it. 
An optimal IP policy creates just enough incentive to cause creative people 
to innovate at the optimal level, but not so much as to restrain excessively 
others who want to build on their work. Maintaining this balance requires 
a determination of both the optimal duration and the optimal scope, or 
coverage, of IP rights. If the duration of rights is too long or the coverage 
too broad, future innovators face a shrunken public domain of ideas that 
they can borrow freely. If the scope of IP rights is too narrow, then the IP 
laws may provide insufficient incentive to get people to innovate in the 
first place. Maintaining this balance is critical. The periods of civilization 
most conducive to innovation have been those where IP rights were given 
some protection but people were also reasonably free to build upon the 
work of others.14 
Although the primary purpose of antitrust law is to promote competi-
tion, for large parts of their history, the antitrust laws have done just the 
opposite. Antitrust developed overly protective rules that shielded ineffi-
cient businesses from competition at the expense of consumers. By the 
same token, the effect of the IP laws has often been to undermine rather 
than to promote innovation by granting IP holders rights that go far 
beyond what is necessary to create appropriate incentives to innovate and 
by increasing the costs of innovation in markets where innovation requires 
building on the works of others. Although the constitutional purpose of 
most of the IP laws is to further innovation, their actual effect is unclear. 
They may further it, but they may actually retard it, and, in any event, 
  
 12. For a recent application, see Dippin’ Dots, Inc. v. Mosey, 476 F.3d 1337, 1346–48 (Fed. Cir. 
2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 375 (2007). 
 13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (giving Congress the power to “promote the progress of science 
and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their 
respective writings and discoveries”). 
 14. See DIAMOND, supra note 5, at 240–45. 
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almost no one believes that the system of IP laws that we currently have is 
optimal. 
I. CONTROLLING COMPETITION: THE STORMY HISTORY OF THE 
ANTITRUST/IP RELATIONSHIP 
Both IP policy and antitrust policy have a great deal to say about the 
competitiveness of the innovation process. But over time, the relative do-
main of antitrust law and IP law has shifted back and forth very consider-
ably. In the earliest period of antitrust policy, patent rights reigned su-
preme and antitrust policy gave way. Later on we entered a protracted 
period in which patent rights in particular were thought of as inherently 
monopolistic and almost a competitive evil, and antitrust law was given 
wide and anticompetitive authority to limit them. More recently, we have 
operated in a period of IP expansion in which the domain of patent and 
copyright law have been magnified at the expense of antitrust, which has 
been regarded as inherently overdeterrent. And even more recently, we 
have begun to see judicial and perhaps even congressional responses to 
withering attacks on an overly protective patent system. 
Historically and today, the principal regulator of competition in IP-
intensive markets in the United States has been antitrust law, which is of 
very general application. Indeed, the words “patent,” “copyright,” and 
“intellectual property” never appear in the Sherman Act. The word patent 
appears once in the Clayton Act, in reference to tying arrangements and 
exclusive dealing.15 This is Congress’s way of saying that the basic rules 
of competition must be the same in all markets, except insofar as Congress 
has provided differently in some market-specific statute. Except for the 
provision concerning patent ties, which was added in 1914, the antitrust 
laws give courts absolutely no guidance as to how the presence of IP rights 
should affect a challenge to a practice as anticompetitive. Incidentally, 
neither does any provision of the antitrust laws define the word “competi-
tion.” The courts are given no guidance on such fundamental questions as 
whether a practice is “anticompetitive” only when it decreases short-run 
output and raises price, or whether it also covers restraints on innovation 
whose harmful effects might take far longer to realize and that, in any 
event, are more difficult to measure. 
During the earliest years of its enforcement, antitrust was generally 
placed in a subservient position to the patent laws. In this pre-digital, pre-
  
 15. Section 3 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14, provides: 
It shall be unlawful . . . to lease or make a sale . . . of goods . . . , whether patented or 
unpatented, . . . on the condition, agreement, or understanding that the lessee or purchaser 
thereof shall not use or deal in the goods . . . of a competitor . . . , where the effect . . . 
may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly . . . . 
Id. 
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computer age, the anticompetitive potential of copyrights was rarely an 
issue. The landmark example of weak antitrust and strong patents was the 
A. B. Dick decision in 1912.16 A. B. Dick was an office equipment manu-
facturer that produced a popular mimeograph machine, which rotated 
blank sheets of paper over an ink-filled drum upon which a stencil had 
been placed. The machine was the best alternative available to the photo-
copier in the early part of the twentieth century. A. B. Dick sold the ma-
chines with a license notice affixed to them providing that the machine 
“may be used only with the stencil paper, ink, and other supplies made by 
A. B. Dick Company . . . .”17 Today we would call this a tying arrange-
ment, or conditioning the sale of one product on the buyer’s agreement to 
purchase a second one. Perhaps the most important thing in assessing the 
A. B. Dick tie is that neither the antitrust laws nor the Patent Act had any-
thing to say about ties. The Sherman Act prohibited only contracts “in 
restraint of trade,”18 without defining that term. The Patent Act had noth-
ing to say on the subject. Another important factor is that the tied prod-
ucts—stencil paper, ink, and supplies—were ordinary commodities that 
were sold in numerous markets that had nothing to do with A. B. Dick’s 
mimeograph machine. Today, we would say that they are staple commodi-
ties capable of non-infringing uses. The action itself was brought under the 
Patent Act rather than the antitrust laws against Henry, someone who 
knowingly sold the supplies to another person who intended to use them 
on A. B. Dick’s patented machine.19 The Supreme Court held that such a 
sale constituted contributory infringement of the patent, and, although the 
defendant raised the Sherman Act in defense, the Court also held that it 
did not apply.20 
Congress was unhappy with both the antitrust holding and the contri-
butory infringement holding in A. B. Dick. Two years later, it passed the 
Clayton Act, whose § 3 reached tying arrangements involving patented 
goods.21 In 1952, Congress also changed the Patent Act to make clear that 
the sale of staple goods or commodities was not contributory infringement 
of a patent, even if the purchaser intended to use them in violation of a 
patentee’s tying contract.22 
  
 16. Henry v. A. B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1 (1912). 
 17. Id. at 11. 
 18. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
 19. A. B. Dick, 224 U.S. at 11–12.  
 20. Id. at 46–47, 49. 
 21. Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 3, 38 Stat. 731 (1914) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 14 (2006)). 
 22. The 1952 amendments provided that contributory infringement would not result from the sale 
of a “staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use.” Patent Act, 
ch. 950, 66 Stat. 811 (1952) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2006)). See Charles W. 
Adams, A Brief History of Indirect Liability for Patent Infringement, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & 
HIGH TECH. L.J. 369, 369 (2006). 
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One patent licensing rule that mocked competition was first announced 
by the Supreme Court in its 1902 Bement decision and reiterated in the 
General Electric decision.23 In Bement, a half-dozen firms operating sepa-
rately had developed spring tooth harrows for agricultural use and pa-
tented various features in them.24 A number of conflicts arose about patent 
claims, and these disputes were settled when the patentees licensed their 
patents to the defendant, permitting it to manufacture the harrows. How-
ever, the license also stipulated the price at which the harrows had to be 
sold. The lawsuit arose when the defendant later repudiated the agreement, 
and the Supreme Court upheld both the agreement and the minimum price 
restriction.25 The severest implications of this rule were not felt until 1926, 
however, in the government-brought GE case.26 GE held a number of pa-
tents on incandescent light bulbs. It both produced bulbs itself and licensed 
Westinghouse to produce them in an agreement that stipulated the price 
that Westinghouse must charge. The Supreme Court rejected the govern-
ment’s Sherman Act claim, holding that price fixing between two manu-
facturing competitors was lawful if the fix was contained in a patent li-
cense.27 This rule, which is highly controversial,28 remains with us to this 
day and has served to exonerate many nearly naked price-fixing agree-
ments. 
The Supreme Court was not completely unconcerned about competi-
tion in patent licenses; however, it expressed its concern more through 
patent policy than antitrust policy. Already, prior to the passage of the 
Sherman Act, the Supreme Court had applied the patent law’s “first sale” 
doctrine so as to invalidate restraints on competition. Under the first sale 
doctrine, once a patentee or copyright holder sells a protected good, it 
loses control. For example, in Adams v. Burke, decided before the Sher-
man Act was passed, the Court used the first sale doctrine to strike down a 
patentee’s limitations on the geographic territories in which a reseller of a 
patented good could sell it,29 and in Keeler it held that a reseller of a pa-
tented bed could resell it in a territory that the patentee had reserved to 
itself.30 Effectively, these early decisions used the Patent Act to create 
limitations on both vertical and horizontal territorial restraints that the 
  
 23. United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926); E. Bement & Sons v. Nat’l Harrow 
Co., 186 U.S. 70 (1902). 
 24. Bement, 186 U.S. at 76–77. 
 25. Id. at 95. 
 26. Gen. Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476.  
 27. Id. at 489. 
 28. For one recent attempt to defend it, see Stephen M. Maurer & Suzanne Scotchmer, Profit 
Neutrality in Licensing: The Boundary Between Antitrust Law and Patent Law, 8 AM. L. & ECON. 
REV. 476 (2006). 
 29. Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. 453, 456–57 (1873). 
 30. Keeler v. Standard Folding-Bed Co., 157 U.S. 659, 666 (1895). 
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Supreme Court would apply under the antitrust laws as well.31 Similarly, 
in its 1908 decision in Bobbs-Merrill, the Court held that the first sale 
doctrine prevented a patentee from enforcing a resale price maintenance 
provision in a copyright license.32 This was only three years before the 
Supreme Court held in Dr. Miles that the Sherman Act made resale price 
maintenance unlawful.33 Just last year, that decision was itself overruled 
by the Supreme Court’s Leegin decision, which now creates a rule of rea-
son for resale price maintenance.34 And this year, the Supreme Court con-
firmed the continuing vitality of the first sale doctrine.35 
So during this early period, the Supreme Court drew its competition 
policy for innovation markets from a mixture of IP and antitrust law, but 
antitrust generally took a back seat. That would change beginning in 1914 
when Congress passed the Clayton Act, including its prohibition of patent 
ties.36 In 1916, the Court overruled the A. B. Dick case in Motion Picture 
Patents, which involved a license restriction found to violate that statute.37 
The patentees were in fact a cartel that was dominated by interests belong-
ing to Thomas Alva Edison. Edison had made the showing of motion pic-
tures much more commercially viable by the use of sprocketed wheels on 
the projector that engaged little holes on the edges of the film. This tech-
nology enabled the film to run smoothly through the projector and elimi-
nated much of the jerkiness of the earliest motion pictures. The Motion 
Picture Patents Company, sometimes called the “Edison trust,” quite 
clearly intended to monopolize the American motion picture market. First, 
the trust obtained an exclusive supply contract from Kodak, the dominant 
  
 31. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 379 (1967) (finding vertically im-
posed territorial restrictions unlawful per se), overruled by Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 
U.S. 36 (1977) (applying rule of reason); see 8 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, 
ANTITRUST LAW § 1643 (2d ed. 2004). 
 32. Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 350–51 (1908). 
 33. Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 400–01 (1911).  
 34. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2710 (2007). 
 35. Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2109 (2008). Patentee LG provided 
technology that Intel used in microprocessors and chipsets, subject to a license condition that this 
technology could not be used by the chip purchasers in combination with non-Intel components. When 
Quanta built computers that employed Intel chips with non-Intel components, LG sued it for infringe-
ment. The Supreme Court held that the first sale rule barred the suit, overruling the Federal Circuit’s 
decision in Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 709 (Fed. Cir. 1992), which had 
exempted “conditional” sales such as this one from the first sale doctrine. The Court concluded: 
This case illustrates the danger of allowing such an end-run around exhaustion. On LGE’s 
theory, although Intel is authorized to sell a completed computer system that practices the 
LGE Patents, any downstream purchasers of the system could nonetheless be liable for pa-
tent infringement. Such a result would violate the longstanding principle that, when a pa-
tented item is “once lawfully made and sold, there is no restriction on [its] use to be im-
plied for the benefit of the patentee.” 
Quanta Computer, 128 S. Ct. at 2118 (quoting Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 453, 457 (1873) 
(alteration in original). 
 36. Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 3, 38 Stat. 731 (1914) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 14 (2006)). 
 37. Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 517 (1917). 
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producer of movie film. Then, they incorporated a license restriction onto 
the projectors forbidding anyone using the projector from showing films 
other than those procured from the company. The company even at-
tempted to blacklist actors and actresses who agreed to work for filmmak-
ers that did not use their equipment. The case itself, just like A. B. Dick, 
was a contributory infringement suit, not an antitrust suit. This time the 
Court refused to find contributory infringement and cited the Clayton Act 
only as confirmation of its holding that the use of rivals’ films did not vi-
olate any right created by the patent.38 
Motion Picture Patents was undoubtedly a reasonable decision, apply-
ing patent policy so as to undermine an attempt to hijack the entire Ameri-
can motion picture industry.39 In subsequent decades, however, antitrust 
and patent policy both became increasingly aggressive, particularly against 
patent tying arrangements. Initially, in United Shoe Machinery in 1922, 
the Supreme Court condemned a lease arrangement in which the defendant 
required shoe manufacturers to take its full line of shoe-making equipment 
to the exclusion of rivals’ equipment.40 United Shoe’s market share was 
above 90%, making this a fairly clear cut case of tying by a monopolist. 
But a decade later in Carbice, the Supreme Court refused to enforce a 
license agreement by the owner of a patented ice box that required users of 
the box to use only its own dry ice.41 The Court applied patent law but 
declared in a footnote that the practice also implicated § 3 of the Clayton 
Act.42 Justice Brandeis gave his famous theory of the case that prompted 
so much ridicule from later critics of Supreme Court tying law, particular-
ly those in the Chicago School. The tying requirement permitted: 
[T]he patent owner to “derive its profit, not from the invention on 
which the law gives it a monopoly, but from the unpatented sup-
plies with which it is used,” [and which are] “wholly without the 
scope of the patent monopoly.” . . . If a monopoly could be so 
expanded, the owner of a patent for a product might conceivably 
monopolize the commerce in a large part of unpatented materials 
used in its manufacture. The owner of a patent for a machine 
  
 38. See id. at 517–18 (“Our conclusion renders it unnecessary to make the application of this 
statute to the case at bar which the circuit court of appeals made of it, but it must be accepted by us as 
a most persuasive expression of the public policy of our country with respect to the question before 
us.”). 
 39. On the history, see MICHAEL CONANT, ANTITRUST IN THE MOTION PICTURE INDUSTRY 18–
21, 77–80 (1960); BENJAMIN B. HAMPTON, A HISTORY OF THE MOVIES 8–11, 17–24, 34, 64–76, 79–
81 (Arno Press 1970) (1931); LEWIS JACOBS, THE RISE OF THE AMERICAN FILM 8, 81–85, 88, 164–
65, 291–92 (1939). 
 40. United Shoe Mach. Corp. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451, 465 (1922). 
 41. Carbice Corp. of Am. v. Am. Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27, 34–35 (1931). 
 42. Id. at 31–32, 34 n.4. 
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might thereby secure a partial monopoly on the unpatented sup-
plies consumed in its operation.43 
Of course, no one could acquire a monopoly in dry ice, an ordinary 
commodity made by unpatented processes. Following Carbice, the law of 
patent ties became completely lost from its moorings in concerns about 
monopoly and competition. Two decisions in the 1930s indicated that both 
patent policy and antitrust policy would pursue parallel courses in con-
demning patent ties that raised no serious competitive issues. In Morton 
Salt in 1942, the Supreme Court held that its now developing doctrine of 
patent “misuse” forbade a patentee from enforcing a patent if it was also 
engaged in tying of unpatented goods, even if the infringer was not injured 
by the tying arrangement.44 The patentee had developed a salt-injecting 
machine for measuring and inserting the proper amount of salt into canned 
goods as they passed down an assembly line. It required users to purchase 
its salt as a condition of using the machine. The defendant was not a com-
peting supplier of salt, who might have had a competitive gripe. Rather, it 
was an obvious infringer who was making the machines in violation of the 
patent and was not affected by the salt tie at all. The Supreme Court held 
that one who engaged in such a tie was misusing his patent in violation of 
the principles of the Patent Act, which contained no such authorization.45 
Then five years later, the United States government obtained a decree that 
the identical practice by a different firm also violated the antitrust laws.46 
Further, the Court added, while the offense of tying under the antitrust 
laws required a showing of market power, that power would be presumed 
if the tying product—the salt-injecting machine in this case—was pa-
tented.47 With that stroke, patents tied to unpatented goods instantly be-
came a monopoly problem, even if the patent was a relatively minor one 
and attached to a product that was sold in a competitive market. This doc-
trine also spilled into copyright, and the Supreme Court twice condemned 
tying, or “block booking,” of motion pictures, which refers to nothing 
more harmless than the seller’s insistence that the licensee obtain pictures 
for re-showing in blocks of two or more.48 This presumption of market 
power in patent tying cases remained with us until the Supreme Court up-
set it in 2006.49 
  
 43. Id. at 31–32 (quoting Motion Picture Patents, 243 U.S. at 517) (citation omitted). 
 44. Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 494 (1942). 
 45. Id. at 491.  
 46. Int’l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947). 
 47. Id. 
 48. United States v. Loew’s, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 48–49 (1962); United States v. Paramount Pic-
tures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 156–58 (1948). 
 49. Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 42–43 (2006) (overruling Int’l Salt, 
Loew’s, and implicitly, Paramount). 
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Tying was not the only kind of allegedly anticompetitive practice af-
fected by this antitrust expansion, which dominated the central decades of 
the twentieth century. While the case law itself is inconsistent, the Justice 
Department’s Antitrust Division promulgated its own list of nine patent 
“no-nos” in 1970.50 These were said to be practices that were “clearly 
unlawful” and subject to government challenge.51 Lest anyone think that 
antitrust overreaching was limited to the Supreme Court, the Justice De-
partment’s list of nine clearly unlawful practices went well beyond what 
the Supreme Court had condemned and included at least one practice that 
the highest Court had exonerated. In addition to tying, the “Nine No-Nos” 
included mandatory grantbacks requiring a licensee to give back to the 
licensor any improvement patent on the licensed patent. This was in con-
flict with a Supreme Court decision that had upheld the practice.52 Also on 
the list were practices that either fell into the general category of tying, 
such as package licensing and so-called “tie outs,” or exclusive dealing. 
Others were “intrabrand” practices including resale maintenance or re-
strictions on the sale of unpatented goods made with patented products that 
are rarely regarded as anticompetitive today.53 
During this period, antitrust policy exhibited a great deal of overdeter-
rence in IP-rich areas, with the Supreme Court often imagining competi-
tive problems that simply did not exist. But significantly, the law of patent 
misuse, which originated entirely within patent law, was at least as over-
deterrent, as the Carbice case illustrates.54 Even today the Federal Circuit 
holds that the law of patent misuse is somewhat broader than antitrust law 
and condemns some things that antitrust law fails to condemn.55 The law 
of copyright misuse has also been applied to situations that clearly did not 
involve antitrust violations, as many judges have themselves understood.56 
  
 50. Bruce B. Wilson, Patent and Know-How License Agreements: Field of Use, Territorial, Price 
and Quantity Restrictions, Address Before the Fourth New England Antitrust Conference (Nov. 6, 
1970) in ANTITRUST PRIMER: PATENTS, FRANCHISING, TREBLE DAMAGE SUITS 12–21 (Sara-Ann 
Sanders ed., 1970).  
 51. Id. at 12. 
 52. See Transparent-Wrap Mach. Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co., 329 U.S. 637, 640–41 (1947). 
 53. For an excellent discussion of the “Nine No-Nos” and an attempt to place them in the history 
of patent antitrust, see Willard K. Tom & Joshua A. Newberg, Antitrust and Intellectual Property: 
From Separate Spheres to Unified Field, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 167, 178–84 (1997). 
 54. See Carbice Corp. of Am. v. Am. Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27 (1931).  
 55. See, e.g., Senza-Gel Corp. v. Seiffhart, 803 F.2d 661, 670 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (finding misuse 
in patentee’s requirement that those wishing to use its patented process also lease its machine for 
accomplishing the process, even though it was not clear that the tie united “separate products,” as 
antitrust’s tying law requires). 
 56. E.g., Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 978 (4th Cir. 1990) (“So while it is 
true that the attempted use of a copyright to violate antitrust law probably would give rise to a misuse 
of copyright defense, the converse is not necessarily true—a misuse need not be a violation of antitrust 
law in order to comprise an equitable defense to an infringement action. The question is not whether 
the copyright is being used in a manner violative of antitrust law (such as whether the licensing agree-
ment is ‘reasonable’), but whether the copyright is being used in a manner violative of the public 
policy embodied in the grant of a copyright.”); see also Assessment Techs. of WI, LLC v. WIREdata, 
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II. CONTROLLING IP OVERREACHING 
But today we are living in a much different age. The robustness of IP 
law is at an all-time high, and antitrust has been trimmed down to size 
over a thirty-year period of liability limiting Supreme Court decisions. 
A. The Comparative Advantage of Antitrust 
I believe that antitrust should not be too defensive about asserting a 
broader role in IP competition disputes. This is so for two reasons. First, 
the extent of special interest capture is significantly greater in IP law than 
in antitrust, although today patent law is experiencing some important re-
forms. Second, antitrust has profited greatly from its period in the wilder-
ness, something that the IP laws have yet to experience. 
But an important qualifier is that the courts may not contradict consti-
tutional legislation that has spoken clearly. A court may think that a par-
ticular statute so completely reflects special interest capture and ignores 
the public interest that it is affirmatively harmful. That may be a ground 
for narrow construction of ambiguous terms, but it is certainly not a basis 
for ignoring what the statute says. Likewise, while antitrust may be able to 
speak more forcefully in IP areas, it can do so only where IP statutes 
themselves are silent or speak consistently. Practices that are authorized 
by the IP statutes cannot form the basis of antitrust violations. 
The antitrust statutes are among the simplest and most elegant of the 
federal regulatory regimes. All of the substantive antitrust provisions, with 
the exception of the Robinson–Patman Act, state their prohibitions in a 
sentence or two.57 
To be sure, special interests were present at the passage of the Sher-
man and Clayton Acts, and they have been present ever since. The history 
of the Sherman Act suggests that Congress may not have favored “compe-
tition” or efficiency in the abstract, but rather the protection of small busi-
nesses that were threatened by large, aggressive, low cost rivals such as 
Standard Oil. 
But what is even more significant is that particular special interests 
such as those of small oil producers—Ohio Senator John Sherman’s consti-
tuency—did not get any specific mandates for protectionism into the statu-
tory language. Perhaps Congress simply assumed that prohibitions against 
“restraint[s] of trade” in § 1 of the Sherman Act or “monopolizing” in § 2 
  
Inc., 350 F.3d 640, 643, 646–47 (7th Cir. 2003) (conduct akin to misuse; no basis for antitrust viola-
tion). 
 57. The one lengthy antitrust provision, the Robinson–Patman Act, is clearly the exception that 
proves the rule. 15 U.S.C. § 13 (2006). That lengthy, detailed statute is not concerned with injury to 
competition at all, but rather with the protection of small retailers from more aggressive or lower cost 
chain stores. See 14 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 2302 (2d ed. 2006). 
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would serve to protect smaller, inefficient firms from larger ones. Or per-
haps they believed that the larger firms acquired their status strictly by 
means of anticompetitive practices that these provisions reached. But for 
whatever reason, the language chosen by the framers of the Sherman Act 
used terms that either had or have come to have fairly technical meanings 
that we associate with efficiency, marginal cost pricing, and an absence of 
unreasonable exclusion, but not with the protection of any particular inter-
est group. 
So while no statute is free of special interest influence, the antitrust 
laws must be counted among the relatively “cleaner” substantive statutory 
regimes in the United States Code. More importantly, federal antitrust 
policy has gone through an extraordinary “cleansing” policy that began in 
the 1970s. Beginning about that time, academics and eventually courts 
launched a broad-scale attack on antitrust policy, pointing out dozens of 
harmful and competitively silly rules that served to undermine rather than 
promote competition. The Supreme Court responded with a gradually in-
creasing cutback. For example, the “antitrust injury” doctrine developed 
in the Brunswick decision in 1977 required plaintiffs to show that they 
were not merely injured in fact by a technical antitrust violation, but that 
they were injured by truly anticompetitive consequences that flowed from 
that violation.58 Five years later, the Supreme Court imposed significant 
restrictions on antitrust standing that have served to limit the range of 
plaintiffs to people with true competitive injury, such as overcharged con-
sumers and improperly excluded rivals.59 In two important cases decided 
twenty years apart, the Supreme Court greatly strengthened pleading and 
proof requirements, imposing harsh standards for summary judgment in its 
1986 Matsushita decision60 and strict pleading standards in its 2007 Twom-
bly decision.61 On substantive issues, the Supreme Court has made exclu-
sionary practices much more difficult to prove, with holdings on predatory 
pricing in 1993 and 200762 and on refusals to deal in 2004.63 It has signifi-
cantly rewritten the law of vertical restraints.64 More generally, the courts 
  
 58. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977); see also 2A 
PHILLIP E. AREEDA, ROGER D. BLAIR, CHRISTINE PIETTE DURRANCE & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, 
ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 337 (3d ed. 2007). 
 59. Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 
542–44 (1983); see also 2A AREEDA ET AL., supra note 58, ¶ 335d (3d ed. 2007). 
 60. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585–98 (1986); see also 2 
PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 308 (3d ed. 2007). 
 61. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1968–69 (2007); see also 2 AREEDA & 
HOVENKAMP, supra note 60, ¶ 307d. 
 62. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 127 S. Ct. 1069, 1074–75 
(2007); Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222–43 (1993). 
 63. Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 407–15 (2004). 
 64. In chronological order: Cont’l T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 59 (1977) 
(applying rule of reason to vertical nonprice restraints); Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 
466 U.S. 2, 12–18 (1984) (tightening up standards for tying arrangements); State Oil Co. v. Khan, 
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have greatly reduced the use of per se rules except in cases of naked price 
fixing or market division, and required plaintiffs to prove market power 
and anticompetitive effects. In most areas antitrust can no longer be ac-
cused of being overdeterrent. Indeed, in some areas, such as predatory 
pricing and mergers, it is very likely underdeterrent. 
As a result, antitrust has the comparative advantage of well-behaved 
doctrine that, at least currently, is reasonably free of special interest pres-
sure. The patent and copyright acts cannot make the same claim to well-
behaved doctrine, although patent law seems to be entering its own period 
of self-criticism and reform. Both the patent and copyright statutes are 
detailed regulatory codes, which is an important sign of regulatory cap-
ture. Indeed, public choice theory seems to be practically tailor-made for 
the IP laws. The theory suggests that when interest groups are small, rela-
tively homogenous, and have individually large interests at stake, these 
small groups will succeed in controlling government decision makers 
much more effectively than larger groups that are more diverse and whose 
individual stakes are much less.65 
A brief examination of patent and copyright law is revealing. 
B. Patents 
Consistent with its constitutional purpose of creating incentives to in-
novate, an optimal patent policy should provide just enough protection to 
maximize incentives, while not providing so much protection so as to raise 
the cost of innovating by making it too difficult for a firm to build on in-
formation in the public domain or the work of others.66 Finally, one must 
throw into the mix the very considerable costs of running the patent sys-
tem, which include not merely the direct costs of patent provision but also 
the enforcement mechanism, including private litigation costs. 
The private returns to the innovator produced by the patent system 
consist of (1) the increased profit that patent protection gives to the inno-
vator less (2) the increased costs that the innovator incurs in trying to in-
vent around existing patents held by others, in licensing from them, or in 
organizing research and development so that it will be patentable rather 
than along some other avenue that is otherwise more efficient but not pa-
  
522 U.S. 3, 22 (1997) (applying rule of reason to maximum price fixing); Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. 
Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 31 (2006) (overruling presumption that patented tying product confers 
sufficient market power to make a tie unlawful); Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 
127 S. Ct. 2705, 2718–20 (2007) (applying rule of reason to resale price maintenance). 
 65. See
 
DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL 
INTRODUCTION 18–19, 23 (1991); Christina Bohannan, Reclaiming Copyright, 23 CARDOZO ARTS & 
ENT. L.J. 567, 568 (2006); Herbert Hovenkamp, Legislation, Well-Being, and Public Choice, 57 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 63, 85–89 (1990). 
 66. See SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION AND INCENTIVES 127–59 (2004). 
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tentable.67 One must also subtract the increased costs of protecting one’s 
own innovation by litigating patent infringement suits and defending the 
infringement suits of rival patentees. It is by no means clear that these 
returns are positive in most industries. 
By and large patent applications are ex parte, so patent examiners have 
their contact with prospective patentees rather than with prospective in-
fringers. Innovators in an area are typically well organized and often small 
in number; frequently those in a particular industry have a homogeneity of 
interests. As economists Adam B. Jaffe and Josh Lerner suggest, two phe-
nomena of the recent decades have exacerbated this.68 One is a pay-as-you-
go system under which the PTO derives its income from patent applica-
tions. This system has changed the incentive structure to make it more 
likely that a particular patent application will be granted. The other is the 
creation of the Federal Circuit, a specialist court of appeals that was frank-
ly intended to strengthen patent protection and that has lived up to its 
name.69 As a result of these developments, both the number of granted 
patents and the volume of infringement litigation has surged dramatically 
in recent years. 
Few regulatory systems in the United States are as closed as the patent 
system. As one would expect, the system has become increasingly respon-
sive to the interests of patentees and much less so to the much larger and 
more diverse population that represents users of patented products or 
processes, either as end users or as intermediate licensees.  
Within the last decade the United States patent system has been made 
the subject of extensive and withering attacks, some of which have already 
had a significant impact on Supreme Court decision making. Briefly: 
• The number of patents issued has exploded dramatically over 
the last two decades, and many patents have been issued that in-
  
 67. On this point, see Arnold Plant, The Economic Theory Concerning Patents for Inventions, 1 
ECONOMICA 30, 32, 38–46 (1934); see also 2 MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, MAN, ECONOMY, AND STATE 
658–59 (Nash Publ’g 1970) (1962) (“It is by no means self-evident that patents encourage an increased 
absolute quantity of research expenditures. But certainly patents distort the type of research expendi-
ture being conducted. . . . Research expenditures are therefore overstimulated in the early stages 
before anyone has a patent, and they are unduly restricted in the period after the patent is received. In 
addition, some inventions are considered patentable, while others are not. The patent system then has 
the further effect of artificially stimulating research expenditures in the patentable areas, while artifi-
cially restricting research in the nonpatentable areas.”).  
 68. ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: HOW OUR BROKEN 
PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 1–24 
(2004). 
 69. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 8, at 334–53; see also William M. Landes & Richard A. 
Posner, An Empirical Analysis of the Patent Court, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 111, 112 (2004) (“As ex-
pected, the Federal Circuit has turned out to be a pro-patent court in comparison to the average of the 
regional courts that it displaced in the patent domain.”). See generally Saul Levmore, Property’s 
Uneasy Path and Expanding Future, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 181, 190 (2003); Gerard N. Magliocca, 
Ornamental Design and Incremental Innovation, 86 MARQ. L. REV. 845, 863 (2003).  
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volve innovations that appear not to meet the non-obviousness re-
quirement or that rest on overly broad or ambiguous claims; 
• While the patent system is said to create “property” rights, the 
boundaries of this property are often very poorly delineated, giv-
ing non-holders inadequate timely information about when they 
might be committing a trespass. This serves as a major deterrent 
to invention; and 
• Patent infringement litigation and related enforcement activities 
have become so costly that the system creates negative rather than 
positive incentives to innovate in most industries. 
1. Excessive Number of Trivial or Unclear Patents 
On the first point, the scope of patentable subject matter has broa-
dened considerably in recent decades, and the standards for patentability 
have been lowered to the point that the new innovator must often confront 
hundreds of patents covering dubious improvements and containing ambi-
guously broad claims.70 The Supreme Court’s recent KSR decision ad-
dressed a portion of this problem by raising the patentability standard for 
non-obvious subject matter.71 Section 103 of the Patent Act provides that a 
patent should not issue if “the differences between the subject matter 
sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a 
whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a 
person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter per-
tains.”72 
Under the Federal Circuit’s version of the so-called “teaching, sugges-
tion, or motivation” test (TSM), a patent would be considered non-obvious 
unless there was some prior “teaching, suggestion, or motivation” reflect-
  
 70. See JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 68, at 1–24; see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE 
INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY (2003), availa-
ble at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf (complaining repeatedly of questionable pa-
tents on obvious subject matter and claims that go far beyond the actual invention described in the 
patent application). Among the most stinging indictments are those developed in JAMES BESSEN & 
MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT 
INNOVATORS AT RISK (2008). 
 71. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1741–43 (2007). 
 72. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006). The first sentence of the statute reads:  
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or described 
as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the subject matter sought 
to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been 
obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to 
which said subject matter pertains. 
Id. 
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ing the claimed innovation.73 Under the Federal Circuit’s approach, one 
had to point to a fairly specific reference in prior art suggesting the pa-
tented invention. The Supreme Court rejected that in favor of a broader 
and more flexible approach, suggesting that if the patent claim could have 
been predicted by one skilled in the prior art, then that claim flunks the 
obviousness test. The Court wrote, “[T]he combination of familiar ele-
ments according to known methods is likely to be obvious when it does no 
more than yield predictable results,”74 even if those results might occur in 
a different market.75 
But the problem identified in KSR is likely only the tip of the iceberg. 
Many patents, particularly those pertaining to business methods and soft-
ware, suffer from “abstract” or vague claims capable of being construed 
very broadly so as to apply to situations far different from the invention in 
question, often straying to things that the inventor very likely did not con-
template at all.76 At this writing, KSR’s impact on such patents remains to 
be seen. 
2. Lack of Adequate Boundaries and Notice 
On the second point, that clearly defined property rights produce in-
centives to invest is beyond controversy. Largely for that reason, the states 
have gone to elaborate lengths to maintain accurate land and boundary 
records. A landowner who is unsure about his title or the location of his 
boundaries has a greatly reduced incentive to invest further in his proper-
ty. But the fact is that land title disputes represent at most a trivial cost of 
land development generally. 
While patents are typically described as a type of property, the state of 
the “title records” is an embarrassment in comparison with more tradition-
al property interests.77 Overly broad or ambiguous patent claims that are 
  
 73. KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1730.  
 74. Id. at 1739. 
 75. See id. at 1740 (“The principles underlying these cases are instructive when the question is 
whether a patent claiming the combination of elements of prior art is obvious. When a work is availa-
ble in one field of endeavor, design incentives and other market forces can prompt variations of it, 
either in the same field or a different one. If a person of ordinary skill can implement a predictable 
variation, § 103 likely bars its patentability. For the same reason, if a technique has been used to 
improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would improve 
similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual application is beyond 
his or her skill.”). 
 76. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 70, at 199 (“The process of interpreting patent claims is 
one of mapping the words in a patent to a range of technologies, much as a surveyor maps the words 
in a deed to demarcations on the ground. With abstract patent claims, however, the words cover un-
known territory, claiming technologies that are unknown at the time the patent is filed and that might 
change over time, especially in the fast-moving fields of technology. . . . [T]hese claims reward paten-
tees for inventions they do not invent. This means that the actual, future inventors face reduced incen-
tives because they have to obtain a license from the patentee . . . .”). 
 77. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 70, at 46–72. For differing perspectives on the “property” 
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given recognition by courts mean that an outsider often cannot be sure 
what the boundaries of a particular patent are. Numerous trivial patents, 
coupled with insurmountable classification problems, make a satisfactory 
search of the title records almost impossible. Indeed, the boundaries of 
this property right are so poorly defined that often the optimal course for 
innovating firms is to ignore patents while engaging in research and devel-
opment and simply pay the costs of litigating infringement disputes.78 Fur-
ther, the existence of patent “continuations” entail that patentees can ex-
pand their claims retroactively, sometimes even covering the inventions of 
others that did not obviously infringe the original patent and who thus had 
no notice of the conflicting claim at the time they put forth their inven-
tion.79 The results are dramatic—the more poorly patent boundaries are 
defined, the higher are litigation costs in relation to patent value.80 
In this state of affairs, developers of new technology often cannot be 
sure that their innovations infringe the prior patents of others until it is too 
late. They are thus placed in much the same position as a landowner who 
cannot be sure whether a contemplated structure will encroach on land to 
which he does not have good title.81 
  
analogy, see Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 
1031 (2005); Adam Mossoff, Patents as Constitutional Private Property: The Historical Protection of 
Patents under the Takings Clause, 87 B.U. L. REV. 689 (2007); see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Intel-
lectual Property is Still Property, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 108, 112 (1990) (“[A] right to exclude 
in intellectual property is no different in principle from the right to exclude in [traditional] physical 
property.”). 
 78. See Mark A. Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 19 (noting that because of 
great number of patents in certain industries, as well as ambiguities about coverage, many innovating 
firms simply ignore patents, litigate, and pay licensing fees or damages claims when the need arises; 
for such firms infringement litigation is simply a cost of doing business and some large innovators 
have as many as one hundred infringement lawsuits pending against them at one time). One reason that 
firms might willfully ignore patents is because innovating with knowledge of infringement makes one a 
willful infringer, thereby increasing penalties. 
  On the anticommons problem, see generally Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can 
Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. 698 (1998); Michael 
A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 
HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998). 
 79. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 70, at 10 (“It is possible, however, for patent owners to 
hide the claim language that defines patent boundaries from public view for many years, a practice that 
is becoming increasingly frequent.”); see also id. at 220–21 (“A ‘legitimate reason’ to use continuing 
applications under current law is to modify claims to cover a competitor’s technology. This practice is 
permitted regardless of whether the competitor independently invented the technology, and of whether 
the competitor consulted a published patented application and invented around the original claims. 
When such amended claims are granted, the competitor finds they are infringing upon a patent claim 
that was hidden during the often lengthy prosecution. Not surprisingly, such behavior leads to costly 
litigation.”); Mark A. Lemley & Kimberly A. Moore, Ending Abuse of Patent Continuations, 84 B.U. 
L. REV. 63 (2004); Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven N. Sampat, Is the Patent Office a Rubber Stamp? 
(Stanford Law Sch., Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Paper No. 999098, 2007) 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=999098. 
 80. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 70, at 147–64 (showing dramatic uncertainty in high-tech 
areas such as software and a fair amount of certainty in the chemical and pharmaceutical industries). 
 81. On this point, see BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 70, at 46–72. The problem is further ex-
acerbated by infringement suits brought by non-practicing patentees, or patent “trolls,” who often 
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3. Negative Incentives 
While the Constitution recognizes property rights elsewhere, the IP 
Clause is the only place where the power to create the rights is expressly 
tied to the incentive to develop.82 Today, a growing body of evidence sug-
gests that, at best, the patent system provides only weak net incentives to 
innovate, and even then only in a small number of markets. The incentives 
to innovate are probably negative in many, if not most, industries.83 For 
any contemplated innovation, one must compare the incremental value of 
the patent system in increasing anticipated profits by providing for a pe-
riod of exclusivity against the incremental cost. While the data are not 
without ambiguities, about the only industries in which patents provide a 
clear incentive to innovate are chemicals and pharmaceuticals, where the 
anticipated profits from patenting clearly exceed litigation costs.84 In some 
others, particularly computer software and business methods, the costs of 
litigation appear to swamp any incremental profits to be derived from pa-
tent protection.85 
  
assert patents with broad claims against the developers of new technology. To a degree, this problem 
has been addressed by the Supreme Court’s decision in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 
388 (2006), which held that there is no automatic entitlement to an injunction in a patent infringement 
case, but that the right rests on traditional equity factors. Id. at 394. Under eBay, injunctions are 
increasingly denied against non-practicing patentees, or patentees who are not in competition with the 
infringer. See Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, The Aftermath of eBay v. MercExchange, 126 S. Ct. 1837 
(2006): A Review of Subsequent Judicial Decisions, 89 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 631, 654–
55 (2007) (concluding that (1) the existence of actual competition between the patentee and the infring-
er is the most important factor in determining entitlement to an injunction; and (2) injunctions are very 
typically denied when the patentee does not itself practice the patent); see also eBay, 547 U.S. at 396 
(“An industry has developed in which firms use patents not as a basis for producing and selling goods 
but, instead, primarily for obtaining licensing fees.”) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 82. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts . . . .”).  
 83. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 70, at 1–28. 
 84. See id. at 120–46. On why the patent system seems to work better in the chemical and phar-
maceutical markets, see Lemley, supra note 78, who observes: 
[T]he characteristics of the pharmaceutical industry are quite different than the component 
industries in which it is common to ignore patents. The need for strong patent rights is 
greater in that industry because of the cost and delay associated with FDA approval. Vir-
tually all patent owners in the industry are market competitors who rely on the exclusivity 
of the patent system . . . . The scope of the patents is generally quite clear, as they are de-
fined in terms of chemical structure, and disputes over what the patent means are less 
common than in information technology. Pharmaceutical innovation is rarely cumulative, so 
the need for further research on a particular drug after FDA approval, while not zero, is 
not particularly high. Further, the patent owner identifies up front the patents that cover a 
particular product. It can do that because market entry is delayed for years and even dec-
ades by the FDA approval process, with the result that all parties involved will generally 
know what patent rights exist before the generic seeks to enter. All of these characteristics, 
particularly those that flow from the FDA regulatory structure, make the need for strong 
patent protection greater and the costs of that protection less.  
Id. at 29–30. 
 85. See the tables in BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 70, at 120–46, and their disturbing conclu-
sion that “by the late 1990s litigation costs clearly exceeded the profits from patents outside the chemi-
cal and pharmaceutical industries.” Id. at 140. Landes and Posner reach roughly the same conclusions. 
See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 8, at 310–16. 
File: HOVENKAMP.competitionpolicy.FINAL.docCreated on: 11/14/2008 1:28:00 PM Last Printed: 11/24/2008 12:04:00 PM 
2008] Meador Lecture: Innovation and Competition Policy 123 
 
C. Relevance for Antitrust Policy 
While the problems of the patent system are manifold—indicating a 
regulatory process that is sorely in need of reform—that task does not gen-
erally implicate the antitrust laws. The antitrust laws were not designed to 
repair other government regulatory processes, but rather to take these 
processes as given and strive to further competition consistent with their 
mandates. 
Unfortunately, the same defects that make the patent system work so 
poorly and anticompetitively also serve to narrow the role of antitrust en-
forcement. A good example is the Walker Process86 line of cases that in-
volve antitrust challenges to improper infringement suits. These decisions 
find an antitrust violation only if there was “fraud” in obtaining a patent, 
or more typically if it was clear at the time the infringement suit was filed 
that a patent was not enforceable under the circumstances of the suit.87 But 
ambiguity about patent coverage entails that reasonable persons could dif-
fer about the scope, coverage, or validity of a patent. And when reasona-
ble minds can differ about the merits of a suit, the courts are clearly un-
willing to say that bringing the suit is improper, even though the infringe-
ment plaintiff might subsequently lose it. In sum, the efficacy of an anti-
trust action for “clearly” improper infringement suits depends on a set of 
clear patent rights in the first place, which the patentee subsequently ig-
nores in bringing its suit. 
The same thing is true of the antitrust attitude toward patent settle-
ments, where the tendency of courts is to give extraordinary deference that 
even approves actions that would be per se unlawful in the absence of a 
license agreement.88 For example, a naked market division agreement be-
tween two companies would be per se unlawful and sometimes even a 
criminal violation. However, a patent dispute that settles with a market 
division license agreement will be approved, and the courts repeatedly 
state that they are loathe to inquire into such things as whether the patents 
in question are valid.89 The policy of the law, after all, is to encourage 
settlement, and the only relevant persons disputing validity are the parties 
to the settlement agreement. The very ambiguity that makes patent validity 
or scope difficult to determine also undermines antitrust enforcement. 
This extreme deference to settlements distinguishes patents from other 
types of property where titles are clearer. For example, a gasoline station 
operator clearly has the right to keep a competitor from opening a compet-
ing station on his own property. But suppose the first operator owned good 
  
 86. Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965). 
 87. See 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 11, ¶ 706. 
 88. See 12 HOVENKAMP, supra note 10, ¶ 2046. 
 89. Id. 
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title to one hundred acres on the west side of the river and brought a tres-
pass action against a builder of a competing station on the east side of the 
river, with no underlying title to support the claim. Suppose then the par-
ties “settled” with an agreement under which the second operator stayed 
out of the market in exchange for a large monthly payment. No court 
would hesitate for a moment to examine the title records and conclude that 
this trespass suit and its settlement were nothing more than a cover for 
naked market division. 
This illustration indicates that the reluctance of courts to intervene in 
IP settlements90 is not simply a function of deference to settlements, as 
courts are fond of saying. Rather, the reluctance is driven mainly by the 
ambiguity of the property rights in dispute. In the case of patents, the very 
difficulty that courts have in determining the scope of the right leads them 
to condone anticompetitive settlements. 
Of course, anticompetitive conduct that falls outside of the authoriza-
tions set by the Patent Act or the patenting process itself can still be made 
subject to antitrust challenge. Among these are improper conduct in patent 
procurement,91 improper infringement activities,92 some acquisitions,93 
perhaps non-use94 and refusals to license,95 a few vertical practices such as 
tying,96 and some horizontal restraints such as price fixing.97 In addition, 
while the pursuit of patent continuations dating back to the initial filing 
date is protected conduct, the antitrust laws may condemn participation in 
a standard-setting organization while secretly perfecting continuations that 
cover the standards being developed.98 
Although optimism may be premature, the patent system does show 
signs that it is capable of reforming itself. One important reason has been 
the emergence of very distinctive interest groups that have widely differing 
notions about the value and optimal nature of patent protection. Just to 
give two prominent examples at the two extremes, the pharmaceutical in-
dustry generally favors strong patent protection, with both long patent 
terms and broad coverage. In that industry there is little “networking,” or 
need for interproduct compatibility, and, as a result, there is little need to 
  
 90. See, e.g., In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 429 F.3d 370 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 91. See 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 11, ¶ 705. 
 92. Id. ¶ 706. 
 93. Id. ¶ 707. 
 94. See id. ¶ 708. 
 95. Id. ¶ 709. 
 96. See 10 PHILLIP E. AREEDA, EINER ELHARGE & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶¶ 
1781–82 (2d ed. 2004). 
 97. See 12 HOVENKAMP, supra note 10, ¶ 2041. 
 98. See 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 11, ¶ 712; see also In re Rambus, Inc., 2006-2 
Trade Cases ¶ 75364 (Fed. Trade Comm’n Aug. 2, 2006). At this writing the FTC’s decision is on 
appeal to the D.C. Circuit. Compare Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297 (3d Cir. 
2007), (involving alleged misrepresentations to a standard-setting organization about the royalties that 
would be charged). 
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license or borrow technology from others. At the same time, developing a 
new drug is extremely costly, and successful drugs typically have a very 
long commercial shelf life. So for a drug manufacturer, the general rule 
about patents is that more is better. 
At the opposite extreme is the high-tech industry, mainly computer 
software and related technology. In this industry interoperability is criti-
cal, and this fact necessitates a great deal of borrowing from others. As a 
result, the patent cross-licensing “thicket” that we have heard so much 
about operates to a far greater extent in, say, computer hardware markets 
than in pharmaceutical markets. Further, the commercial life of electronics 
products is much, much shorter. Today’s innovation is likely to be obso-
lete four or five years from now. As a result, having patents is much less 
valuable in this industry, and having to license patents from others is a far 
greater burden. 
How all of this will eventually play out is very difficult to say. At the 
same time, however, there is little reason to be optimistic that Congress 
will come up with an optimal patent policy. Virtually no one lobbies Con-
gress for a patent regime that facilitates the optimal amount of innova-
tion.99 The pharmaceutical interests want as much protection as possible to 
further their interests, and Silicon Valley wants considerably less protec-
tion in order to further their interests, but any identification of either of 
these regimes with the optimal amount of innovation would be purely 
coincidental. 
D. Copyright 
The political situation for copyright is bleaker than for patents. The 
United States Copyright Act shows all of the signs of special interest cap-
ture that the Patent Act does. Indeed, the Copyright Act reads like a recipe 
book for capture, with numerous special provisions favoring this or that 
interest group. Christina Bohannan has observed that: “As a result of spe-
cial-interest capture, the Copyright Act confers overly broad rights to cop-
yright owners at the expense of the public interest in having access to 
creative works.”100 
  
 99. Congress currently has before it Patent Reform Act, S. 1145, 110th Cong., which was intro-
duced in the Senate on April 18, 2007. See also Patent Reform Act, H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. (intro-
duced in the House on the same day). This legislation is designed to accomplish a number of important 
objectives, including: (1) change to a “first-inventor-to-file” system; (2) reduce patent damage awards; 
(3) enhance post-grant opposition proceedings; (4) provide for publication of all applications; (5) allow 
for better third-party submissions; (6) limit infringement venues to reduce forum shopping; (7) allow 
the PTO to set its own fees; (8) remove residency restrictions for judges on the Federal Circuit; (9) 
authorize the PTO to require pre-filing patent searches and explanations; (10) strengthen the doctrine 
of inequitable conduct; (11) clarify the rules on unintentional delays in filing. 
100. Bohannan, supra note 65, at 568. 
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William F. Patry, a former House IP Subcommittee staff member and 
now the author of a copyright treatise has commented that: 
Copyright interest groups hold fund raisers for members of Con-
gress, write campaign songs, invite members of Congress (and 
their staff) to private movie screenings or sold-out concerts, and 
draft legislation they expect Congress to pass without any changes. 
In the 104th Congress, they are drafting the committee reports and 
haggling among themselves about what needs to be in the report. 
In my experience, some copyright lawyers and lobbyists actually 
resent members of Congress and staff interfering with what they 
view as their legislation and their committee report. With the 
104th Congress we have, I believe, reached a point where legisla-
tive history must be ignored because not even the hands of con-
gressional staff have touched committee reports.101 
But in this case there does not appear to be very much hope on the ho-
rizon. At least in terms of the interest groups getting Congress’s attention, 
there is not the kind of division that characterizes patent markets. 
The lowest recent point was the passage of the Sonny Bono Copyright 
Term Extension Act, sometimes known as the Mickey Mouse Protection 
Act, in 1998.102 That legislation, which gave a retroactive time extension 
to old copyrights, cannot be squared with any sensible rationale of IP law 
as creating incentives to innovate.103 As Robert P. Merges has observed: 
The Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998 is a 
prime example of legislation that strongly favored a narrow class 
of copyright owners, broadly but mildly affected many present and 
  
101. William F. Patry, Copyright and the Legislative Process: A Personal Perspective, 14 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 139, 141 (1996) (emphasis omitted); see also Joseph P. Liu, Copyright 
and Time: A Proposal, 101 MICH. L. REV. 409, 448 (2002) (“It is widely accepted that copyright 
legislation responds quite directly to the lobbying efforts of the copyright industries. It is not hard to 
see why. A narrow group of interests—namely the movie, music, publishing, and software industries—
stands to benefit from expansion of intellectual property protection. They have the resources and 
incentives to lobby for such expansion in Congress. By contrast, consumers individually are largely 
indifferent to such expansions. Although they bear much of the cost of expansions, and such costs may 
be significant in the aggregate, each consumer bears only a minuscule share, spread out over time. 
Thus, as public choice theorists predict, consumers do not band together in sufficient numbers to 
oppose efforts by the copyright industries to expand protection.”); Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and 
Reality in Copyright Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1197, 1246 (1996) (“It is hardly shocking to discover 
that interest-group power has shaped copyright legislation. . . . What is surprising is the paucity of 
criticism—from Congress, public interest groups, and the academic community—that has accompanied 
each new expansion of copyright protections.”). 
102. Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C., but particu-
larly at 17 U.S.C. §§ 302, 304(a)–(b) (2006)). 
103. The provision survived a constitutional challenge in Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003); 
see also Bohannan, supra note 65, at 568. 
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future consumers, was intensively lobbied, and became law with 
little opposition. . . . From an incentive point of view, the Act is 
virtually worthless . . . .104 
As public choice theory predicts, broader IP protection is most likely 
to occur when the groups who will benefit from it are well organized 
while opposition is diffuse. The Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA)105 
fell into that category because its burdens fall on all of us, somewhat 
lightly on most and perhaps a little heavier on others. But the benefits 
were large and enjoyed by a few. In contrast, if strong special interests are 
lined up on both sides, then expansion is less likely to occur. Database 
protection provides a good example of the latter.106 After the Supreme 
Court’s Feist decision made clear that simple collections of facts assem-
bled in a database were not entitled to copyright protection,107 a move be-
gan for Congress to enact database protection legislation.108 In this case, 
however, there were as many strong interest groups who favored free and 
open access to data as those who were in a position to earn significant 
royalties from compilations of public domain data. So far, such legislation 
has not passed. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, here are a few general principles and then some specific 
recommendations. The general principles are these: 
First, while we should not completely give up on the Constitution, the 
landscape for constitutional control of innovation competition is not prom-
ising.109 Even for fairly egregious instances of special interest capture, 
  
104. Robert P. Merges, One Hundred Years of Solicitude: Intellectual Property Law, 1900–2000, 
88 CAL. L. REV. 2187, 2236 (2000). 
105. Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).  
106. Merges, supra note 104, at 2237–38. 
107. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 359–60 (1991). 
108. See J.H. Reichman & Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property Rights in Data?, 50 VAND. L. 
REV. 51, 95–106 (1997). 
109. On this point, see generally Bohannan, supra note 65. To be sure, the Constitution has always 
been the favored tool of those looking for ways to control the special interest elements in IP law. See, 
e.g., Robert Patrick Merges & Glenn Harlan Reynolds, The Proper Scope of the Copyright and Patent 
Power, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 45, 52–53 (2000) (“Against this backdrop, we claim that the constitu-
tional footing for intellectual property protection was constructed with inherent limitations, as well as 
with a grant of power. The specific language (‘to promote progress,’ and ‘for limited times’), the 
history, and the context of the Clause dictate that the congressional power to create property rights 
does not extend to nonproductive rent-seeking. Congress exceeds its authority to grant property rights 
when those rights do not promote progress, or are not sufficiently limited in time. . . . [T]he courts 
must exercise their authority to enforce constitutional limits on the Copyright and Patent power. To 
ignore this duty is to risk the kinds of abuses that threatened the economic progress of seventeenth-
century Britain, and to turn our backs on the historical transformation of ad hoc grants of rent-seeking 
privileges into rule-based systems for recognizing intellectual property rights.”). 
  Constitutional challenges to IP expansion have been consistently rejected. See, e.g., Eldred v. 
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such as the CTEA, the Eldred decision gives us little cause for hope. It’s 
not that there is something wrong with the logic of the constitutional ar-
gument. Congress has enumerated powers and the IP Clause gives Con-
gress the power to create these rights only in order “to promote . . . 
progress.”110 Rather, there is a long history of deference to Congress when 
it is legislating under its express IP powers. Very few of the special inter-
est provisions in the IP laws are as offensive to good public policy as the 
Copyright Term Extension Act, and even that statute survived a constitu-
tional challenge in the Supreme Court, with only two dissenters.111 
Second, statutory IP policy holds more promise, but special interests 
have a particularly strong hold on Congress. This places an added burden 
on the courts to be more mindful of the competitive interest in IP law 
when they are construing those provisions of the IP statutes that are sub-
ject to alternative interpretations.112 A good example in patent law is the 
KSR decision mentioned previously.113 Of course, statutory interpretation 
by the courts can go only so far. When a statute speaks unambiguously, a 
court has little choice except to declare it unconstitutional or else apply it. 
Third, antitrust should be employed aggressively when it is clear that 
the challenged conduct is not explicitly protected by an IP provision and 
when the injury requirements of antitrust are met, including either an in-
jury to competition as traditionally defined or an anticompetitive restraint 
on innovation.114 Although it remains imperfect, antitrust has come 
through a chastening process a much more rigorous and socially useful 
instrument than it had been. Today federal courts are much less likely to 
condemn socially harmless or beneficial practices as anticompetitive. They 
have in large part returned to a more tort-like theory of harm that requires 
plaintiffs to provide satisfactory proof of injury, causation, and damages. 
  
Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003). For one very limited exception, see United States v. Martignon, 346 
F. Supp. 2d 413, 424 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), vacated, 492 F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 2007), in which the district 
court ruled that the anti-bootlegging amendment to the Copyright Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2319A, which 
forbids the sale of unauthorized recordings of live musical performances but has no time limit, violated 
the “limited times” limitation in the Constitution’s IP Clause. The Second Circuit vacated, holding that 
the statute is valid under the Commerce Clause. See also KISS Catalog, Ltd. v. Passport Int’l Prods., 
Inc., 405 F. Supp. 2d 1169, 1172–73 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (holding anti-bootlegging amendment to the 
Copyright Act is exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause power). 
110. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
111. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 222, 242 (Stevens, J. & Breyer, J., dissenting). 
112. Cf. Bohannan, supra note 65, at 568 (noting no textual interpretive issue in Eldred). 
113. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007). Other examples include eBay Inc. v. 
MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391–93 (2006) (no automatic entitlement to an injunction for 
patent infringement, but entitlement must be separately shown under traditional equity principles). See 
also TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29–32 (2001) (denying trade dress 
protection when it was clear from existence of prior utility patent that the device for which the paten-
tee was claiming protection had a utility function, whose patent had expired; in sum rejecting an at-
tempt to lengthen the term of a patent by turning it into a trade dress claim); cf. N.Y. Times Co. v. 
Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 505 (2001) (injunctive relief not automatic for copyright infringement).  
114. For some of the problems identifying and pursuing restraints on innovation under the antitrust 
laws, see Herbert Hovenkamp, Restraints on Innovation, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 247 (2007). 
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Finally, let me suggest a few specific applications in which antitrust 
policy can be brought to bear more effectively than it has been in the past. 
First is IP settlements, or agreements that settle IP infringement dis-
putes. Most IP disputes settle before trial.115 The courts have traditionally 
been extraordinarily reluctant to second guess private settlement agree-
ments. Further, a great deal of uncertainty attends the determination that 
an IP right is valid or has been infringed. The result is that for many if not 
most settlement agreements, no judicial determination has been made 
about the validity, coverage, or infringement of an IP right. Many of these 
settlement agreements impose horizontal territorial or product divisions 
that would be per se unlawful and even criminal offenses if negotiated in a 
different context.116 These “unexamined” settlements need a harder look 
than they have been given in the past. The courts need to be less reluctant 
to look at the IP merits, but only in the subset of cases where the antitrust 
violation is clear. An illustrative example is the Clorox case, in which the 
makers of Lysol and Pine-Sol household chemicals settled a trademark 
infringement suit based on Lysol’s dubious allegation that the term “Pine-
Sol” was misleadingly similar to the term “Lysol.”117 The parties settled 
the dispute with an agreement under which the “Lysol” brand would be 
used for some products and the “Pine-Sol” brand for others. Significantly, 
the agreement did not place any limitations on the two firms’ ability to 
manufacture competing products, but only on their ability to use these 
brands. A court looking at such an agreement, and realizing the competi-
tive potential of settlement agreements, needs to ensure first that a strong 
antitrust violation is being committed; then and only then should it look at 
validity issues.118 
Second, the Federal Circuit should lighten up a little on the standard 
for Walker Process exclusion claims. In its recent Dippin’ Dots decision, 
the court held that a patent applicant who had lied in a sworn statement to 
the PTO that there were no prior sales—which would have invalidated its 
patent application—could nevertheless not show that a subsequent patent 
infringement suit violated the antitrust laws because the only bad conduct 
that the court could uncover was the misrepresentation to the PTO itself.119 
The applicant had made some 800 sales during a one-week period more 
than a year prior to filing the application. The on sale bar in the Patent Act 
  
115. See Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 1501 
(2001). 
116. See 12 HOVENKAMP, supra note 10, ¶ 2046; Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark Janis & Mark A. 
Lemley, Anticompetitive Settlement of Intellectual Property Disputes, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1719, 1739–
65 (2003) (describing examples of anticompetitive provisions within settlement agreements). 
117. Clorox Co. v. Sterling Winthrop, Inc., 117 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 1997). 
118. See 12 HOVENKAMP, supra note 10, at ¶ 2046. 
119. Dippin’ Dots, Inc. v. Mosey, 476 F.3d 1337, 1347–48 (Fed. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. 
Ct. 375 (2007). 
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precludes patentability under such circumstances.120 In the course of a sub-
sequent infringement suit some dozen years later, the improper sales came 
out. The Federal Circuit agreed that this conduct was sufficient to invali-
date the patent, but it held that an antitrust violation could not be estab-
lished without additional evidence of anticompetitive conduct. Because 
some dozen years had elapsed since the patent application had been filed, 
discovering such conduct would be purely a matter of luck. Here, as in 
other areas of antitrust law, it would seem appropriate to use an objective 
test: an antitrust violation consists of exclusionary litigation filed by a do-
minant firm that has good reason to know that its lawsuit is unfounded. 
A third issue is the problem of acquired as opposed to internally de-
veloped patents. I favor a rule that a monopolist should be forbidden from 
acquiring from another anything other than a nonexclusive license in a 
patent that enhances the market power that it already has. Every firm, 
even a monopolist, has an interest in improving its own technology, and to 
that end even the monopolist should be permitted to acquire IP rights in 
technology that has been developed by others. But a nonexclusive license 
is fully sufficient for the monopolist’s needs to improve its own technolo-
gy. It does not need the right to deny rivals access to technology that it has 
not developed itself and which might serve to threaten its monopoly posi-
tion. The same rule should apply to mergers with firms who hold patents 
on competing technology, even if those firms are fairly small. If a patent 
covers technology owned by the acquired firm and which could enhance 
the monopolist’s position or produce a potential to compete with the mo-
nopolist, then the merger should be conditioned on royalty-free licensing 
to outsiders. 
Finally is the problem of patent ties and misuse law. The antitrust law 
of tying arrangements has gotten a very bad name because of the per se 
rule, which condemns ties even when no one is foreclosed. As noted pre-
viously, cases like Carbice121 and International Salt122 condemned defen-
dants for tying common everyday products such as dry ice and salt where 
it was inconceivable that anyone could ever obtain a monopoly. In my 
view, antitrust should jettison this per se rule. But once it has done so it 
should look much more realistically at ties that do foreclose—such as the 
Microsoft–Internet Explorer tie which effectively drove Netscape from the 
market. Tying law has been a very easy target for critics of antitrust law 
because the per se rule makes the law silly and counterproductive. But the 
fact is that there are some markets—particularly those subject to fast mov-
  
120. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006). 
121. Carbice Corp. of Am. v. Am. Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27 (1931); see discussion supra 
text accompanying notes 41–43. 
122. Int’l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947), abrogated by Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. 
Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006); see discussion supra text accompanying notes 44–47. 
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ing technology—in which tying can frustrate entry and limit the growth of 
rivals. 
As the rest of the world becomes more competitive with the United 
States, it becomes increasingly important that we keep our markets for 
innovation as competitive as possible. Right now there are good reasons 
for doubting that the IP laws themselves are up to this task, although there 
is at least some possibility for true patent reform. That suggests a renewed 
and at least moderately expanded role for antitrust enforcement. 
